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IN THE SUPREME C0 URT
0'F THE STATE O,F UTAH
1

GARTH WHITNEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

DAVE WALKER and CHANAE
WALKER,
Def end ants and Appellants.

11959

Respondent's Brief on Appeal
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in the District Court
of Salt Lake County and resulted in a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff in the amount of Thirty Eight Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty One Dollars And 40/100
($38,851.40).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks that the jury verdict and judgment
on the n•nlict be affirmed.
1

011' FACTS
On September 19, 1968, plaintiff, Garth Whitnev
was standing by the sidP of his automobile in a ehnrl:];
parking lot when he was strurk by an automobile being
operated by defendant, Chanae ·walker, and owned hy
her father, defendant Dave vValkN. The issueH on
do not involv0 any factual problems of liability, but
relate primarily to the question of damages. Respondent's statement of facts \Yill, therefore, be limitl'cl to the
facts establishing damages.
Garth -Whitney is forty years of age, is married
and has four children, ages thn•e to seveu (T-8). He is
employed as a real estate saleHman (T-8). At the time
of the accident, he was hit iu the right hip and knocked
into the door of his automobile (T-12).
r.Ir. "\Yhitney's personal injuries were mainly in
groin area. At the time of the impact, that area began
to swell immediately to the size of "a two-quart fruit
jar container" (T-14). He began to suffer immerliate
pam m his penis and scrotum area and down Lis legs
(T-14).
Mr. "Whitney was taken to the Cottonwood Hospital
for emergency treatment. He was in severe shock (T-23):
he had no blood pressure ( T-23) ; his penis was partiall)torn away at the base where it attaches to the body (T27); and there was a five to six inch tear in his
which left his testicles exposed (T-17). He was im-
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mediately given blood (T-23), was catheterized (T-16),
his seroturn was sewed up (T-17), and his other injuries
were atteudcd to (T-17).
After the emergency treatment, he remained hospitalized for sixteen days (T-19, 30). During the first
four to
days, he lost five pints of blood, nearly all of
which 'SilS lost
and most of which went directly
to the area of the groin, scrotum and penis ( T-25). While
in the hospital, his penis and scrotum began to swell
way out of proportion (T-19). The plaintiff described
the scrotum as being the size of a ripe watermelon (T19). His doctor described the swelling as being cantaloupe size ·which would be three to four times the normal
size ( 'I'-:32). Both the penis and scrotum turned a deep
black eolor, as did the entire area around the hip,
stomaeh, abdomen and buttocks (T-19). The injury was
extremely painful (T-79). The hospital could not locate
a supporter large enough to hold the testicles and had to
put togdher a makeshift support from towels, which
limited him to one position (T-29). Plaintiff also became
jaundiced and contacted and ·was treated for gout (T-29).
As a result of the severe swelling, the blood in plaintiff's groin area puddled long enough to calcify (T-35);
the injury interf erred with normal circulation, cutting
off the normal supply of blood (T-36, 42). This caused
serious permanent iujury which was diagnosed to include
partial impotency (T-36) and deformity of the penis
(T-34). The distal or front half of his penis has become
8maller than the other half (T-34). He is unable to have

a normal erection (T-36, 37) and the front or distal portion of his penis remains soft and flaccid during erection
(T-40, 61). There is a decrease of sensation in the distal
part of his penis ( T-31, Gl). He is able to have intercourse only with difficulty (T-40); it is not as satisfactory because of poor function ( T-40). Intercourse is not
as frequent, not as effective and is attended by a strain
on the nervous system (T-40). These injuries are permanent (T-43, 50).
The plaintiff's doctor has counseled with plaintiff's
wife in attempting to get her to accept the situation and
accept Mr. 'Vhitney's maximum performance (T-41).
Still, he feels he is unable to satisfy her and sex relations
are unsatisfactory (T-60). Mr. \Vhitney feels that he has
Emffered a definite loss of manhood (T-GO).
At the time of the trial, Mr. '\TJ1itney still suffered
from soreness and tenderness around the base of the
penis. There is a blood clot in the groin area. There is
lumpiness in the penis, and the plaintiff has difficulty
in urinating (T-60).
The record further shows that the plnintiff was off
work for a period of six (6) months following the accident and had loss of income in the amount of Senn
Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Two Dollars And
42/100 ($7,972.42) (T-58).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E F A I LU R E TO APPOINT A
GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR DEFENDANT
CHANAE 'WALKER, DID NOT SUBSTAN-'
TIALLY AJ?FECT HER RIGHTS AND THE
.JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The record in this case shows that defendant,
Chanae \Valker, was sixteen years old at the time of the
trial herein; that she appeared in said action with her
father, Dave Walker; that at all stages of the proceedings
:-;he was represented by a very distinguished and capable
member of the Utah State Bar; that the case was vigorously contested; that at no time did she make application to haw a guardian ad litem appointed for her; that
she ·waited the return of a jury \'erdict and judgment
without setting up her infancy as defense; and that no
objection was ever made with respect to the failure to
appoint a guardian ad litem until the filing of a Motion
fur a New Trial. Further, appellants have failed to show,
nor han they made any claim, as to how the failure to
appoint a guardian ad litem would have changed the result of the trial or would have prejudiced or affected her
rights in any manner whatsoever.
Cases holding that a judgment would be void under
the ahon· circumstances are in the extreme minority, the
weight of authority being to the effect that where there
is a failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, the judgment
is merely erroneous or irregular and is subject to being
asi(le only upon a showing that substantial rights of
5

the infant were affected by reason of the failure to ap.
point a guardian ad litem
A leading case is Trolinger vs. Cluff, 3G Idaho 5iO
57 P.2d 332. In that case, ·which involved a statute
identical to the Utah statute relating to the appointment
of guardian ad litems, the Idaho Court was facrcl squarely with the question as to the effect of the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem. After citing approximately
forty ( 40) cases in support of the general rule, the Court
held as follows:
"While the judgment rendered in the damage
action may have heen irregular and erroneous,
the rule supported hy the great weight of authority is that the failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem must affect the substantial rights of the infant hefore the judgment will be set aside, reversed or vacated. It must he made to appear that
substantial rights of the infant were affected such
as that the infant had a valid defense to the ad ion,
fraud, collusion, duress, or the same grounds upon
which an adult might haYC' disputed the judgment ...
What loss of substantial rights did the defendant in this case suffer? He was ably represented by counsel in every stage of the proceedings. A trial was had hy jury, before whom he
submitted his evidence, and his case is ably presented on appeal. Wherein are his rights affected
and what different judgment would haw been
rendered, had he been represented by a guardian
ad litem? None was pointed out.

It seems to us that in a case such as the one
at bar, unless the minor, who has reached his
majority, makes some showing, to the effect that
6

he has a meritorious defense or that he has been
misled, deceived, or in some way deprived of some
benefit of an independent and unhampered defense, you should not he allowed to disaf firm a
judgment obtained in the manner this judgment
was obtained, or have the same vacated. After a
most diligent investigation of the authorities, and
a careful consideration of the record in this case
taking into consideration all of the facts and cir-'
cumstances, we have concluded that sufficient
grounds were neither alleged nor established to
warrant vacating the judgment. No substantial
rights of appellant were denied him."

In the case of Tart vs. Register, 257 N. C. 161, 125
S.E.2d 754, a case was tried against a minor without a
guardian ad litem; and after the verdict had been entered, the court appointed a guardian ad litem to cure
an oversight. The judgment was attacked, and the North
Carolina Court held as fallows:
"In the present record, it affirmatively appears, both from the facts found by the judge
helo\v and a careful examination of the record as
a whole, that the interests of the minor have been
fully and amply protected and to the same extent
as if a guardian ad litem had been appointed at
the outset. A new trial will not be awarded for
failure to appoint in apt time."
Other cases at random in support of the general
rule are Levystein Bros. vs. Obrien, 106 Ala. 352, 17 So.
550; King vs. Wilson, 116 Cal. Ap.2d 191, 2 P.2d 833;
Rifzl<'r vs. Eckleberry, 167 Ohio 439, 149 N.E. 2d 728.
While the precise question has never been considered
by thp Utah Supreme Court, the Court did in the case of
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Ballard vs. Buist, 8 Utah 2d 308, 333 P.2d 1071 uphold the
validity of a summons issued by a minor plaintiff and
served upon a def end ant. The Court held that the instituting of the action by a minor without a guardian ad
litem and the obtaining of jurisdiction over the defendant
was a mere irregularity which could be cured by the snhsequent appointment of a guardian ad litem and hy
amendment. This result seems to be in keeping with the
general rule that the failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem is not of a jurisdictional nature.
The majority rule as cited herein is also remarkably
consistent with Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to harmless error. That rule providPs
as follows:
''No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by
the court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or othewise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent \Vith substntial justice. The court at every stage of tho
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.''
·with respect to matters involving the appointment of
guardians ad litem, most courts have reached the same
result as provided in the above rule, even without such a
strong statutory mandate.

It may further be noted that under Rule 17 ( c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the responsibility for the ap·

8

pointment of a guardian ad litem of an infant over fourteen rests first with the infant. If the infant fails to make
application, then it may be made by a relative or friend
or hy another party to the action. Here, neither the infant
nor her father have made application. Thus any oversight
by the plaintiff in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem
cannot be blamed entirely upon the plaintiff, but is a
direct result of defendants' failure to themselves comply
with the rule. To now complain of error would seem to
come "'ithin the language of the court in Helman vs.
Paterson, 121 Utah 332, 241 P.2d 910 wherein it was
stated that "a party who takes a position which either
leads a court into error or by conduct approves the error
committed by the court, cannot later take advantage of
such error in procedure;" or within the language of Hill
rs. Clou:ard, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 wherein the
court states :

"It would be manifestly unjust for a party to
sit silently by, believing that prejudicial error had
been committed, proceed with the trial to its completion, and allow the jury to deliberate and reach
a Yerclict to see if he wins, and then if he loses,
come forward with a claim that such an error
remlcred the nrdict a nullity. If this could be
done, proceedings after such an occurrence would
he in vain and, thus, an imposition upon the court,
the jury aml all concerned. The court will not
countenance any such mockery of its proceedings.''
It might further be noted that even after the entry
of jlHlgmcnt, the infant has failed to apply for the appointnwnt of a guanlian ad litem for the purpose of
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prosecuting this appeal. Thus, even now, the actions of
the defendants are inconsistent with their position, and
it is questionable whether they would have any standing
to raise this question on appeal.
Based upon all of the authorities as cited herein, and
there being no showing or claim of any prejudice to the
infant defendant, plaintiff urges that the judgment
against said defendant remain undisturbed.
POINT II
IF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INFANT WERE TO FAIL, IT WOULD NOT
AFFECT THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
ADULT DEFENDANT, DA VE WALKER.
Point II becomes mute and irrelevant in the event
the court rules in respondent's favor under Point I. If,
however, the court were to declare the judgment against
the minor to be void, then the question arises as to the
effect of such ruling upon the judgment against the adult
defendant. Respondent claims that such judgment should
stand.
The liability of defendant, Dave -Walker, was basrd
upon Section 41-2-22, Utah Code Amwtated, 1952 which
makes the owner of a vehicle liable for the negligrnce
of a minor under the age of eighteen (18) whom he
knowingly permits to drive the vehicle. Cases cited by
the appellant to the effect that an exoneration of the
agent is an exoneration of the principle are completely
inapplicable. Here there is no exoneration of the agent.
IO

If the case against the mmor, Chanae 1vValker, fails, it
is not because she is exonerated from liability, hut berause she is not properly before the court. The effect
would be as though she hacl never been a party in the
first place.
Respondent knows of no authority making an agent
an indispensable or a necessary party in an action against
a principal. Such actions are very common in this jurisdiction. It is inconceivable to think that defendant Dave
Walker would have been C'ntitled to a dismissal in the
event plai11tiff had originally electC'd to make him the sole
defendant in thC' suit. It was held in Munro rs. Duhcrr,
156 F. Supp. 723 that where a
statute
imposes liability upon th<> owner of an automobile for
the actions of a driwr, the driver is not an indispensable
party in an action filed against the owner. Here, defendant Dave
alkC'r was properly madC' a party to the action; the issues of negligC'nce upon which his liability
arose werC' properly and fairly pn•sp11te>d to a jury; and
there is no valid reason why he should not be hound
by the judgment.

In actio11s iiffolving i11fant d<>fondants, it has been
held that wher<' a jndgm<>nt agai11st an i11fa11t defendant
for whom 110 guardia11 ad likm is appointe>d is rP\'ersed
or set aside as to the infant, it will be upheld as to the
otl1cr def<>1Hlants. Cowlin9 rs. Hill, tm Ark. 350, 63 S."W.
800; Lehew I'S. Brummell, 103 l\lo. 546, 15 S."W. 765;
Robison rs. Gatch, 85 Ohio App. 484, 87 N.K2d 904.
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Of particular relevance is the case of Holla11rl cs.
K odirner, 11 Cal. 2d 40, 77 P.2d 843. In that case, it was
held that where an adult defendant failed to reqn<>st the
court to appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant defendant notwithstanding that the right to <lo so was available to him, he cannot subsequently avoi<l a juclgmeut
against him on the ground of failure to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the infant defcudant.
The above authorities are directly in point and regardless of what the court does with the minor defrnrlant,
would require that the judgment against the father stand.
POINT III
THE COURT'S I N S T R U C T I 0 N ON
l\fORTALITY TABLES WAS PROPER.
Instruction No. 15 given by the Court was a starnlanl
JIFU instruction explaining that a person of the age of
plaintiff had a life expectancy of 31.4 years. The instruction included a full and complete explanation of its rPstricted significance. Plaintiff contends that the giving
of such instruction was perfectly proper. Plaintiff further claims that should the giving of this instruction he
in error, that the error was harmless and not prejrnlirial.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the four Ptah cases eitecl
by appellants all state that mortality tables are admissible in evidence where there is evidence> of permanent
injury and "\Vhere said injury results in an impairment
of future earning capacity. None of the cases gin
reason as to why a showing of lost earning capacity
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required, and 0110 wonld wornler \vhy sueh a showing is
necessary. The· mortality tahh•s simply establish evidence
as to th0 lC'ngth of lrnrnan lifr, awl it would seem tliat said
fart ought to h0 rl'l0vant in any east• im·olvi11g St"'rious,
permanent pcrsmial injury. In any cvC'nt, we are 11ot
faced with that problem as th0 instant ease C'asily comes
\Yithin the framC'WOl'k of the d0eidl'<l casC's.
Appt•llants in tlwir bl'id han cited an<l relied primarily upon the case of 8di1atfer rs. J!cCarthy, 113 Utah
343, 19G P.2d DGS. That cas(' inrnlwd a leg injury to a
railroad C'llgi110Pr whieh the doctor ratPtl as a frll pC'rc·ent
(10'.,;) disability to the right lC'g. ThC're was no medical
testimony what soC'\·er as to tlw impairment of earning
C'apacity. The Court held that e\·ell without any mP<lical
e\·idl'llC'<' of imp a i rnll'll t of C'a ruing capacity the e\·idence,
although admittedly not \·C'ry satisfactory, would support
such a finding. In st raining to n•aeh this decision, the
( 'onrt hdd that it ('Oul<l he infrrred that with a weakened
leg, the plaintiff c·,mld not work as many hours as hefore
that he may 11ot lw ahlP to eoHtillUP his employment
for as many y<':Hs as if he hacl 110t heen injured.

11r

In comparing Schlatter to the i11stant l·ase, we find
hprr a mueh stronger casl'. Plaintiff here is Pmployed
as a n•al <·state salesma11. His i11eorne dPpemls entirely
lipon wliat lw sells. 111 the sPlliug fipld, then• eau lw no
hut what a ma11 's mp11tal attitudt> and his confitl('Jll'l' in himst>lf has a din•ct rclatiollship to his earning cnpal'ity. A pc>n;on would lul\'P to close his eyes to
reality to lwlit>vc that whl•n• a man has suffrred permanent !lamagp to his rPprodudive orga11s to the extent that
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he feels he has lost his manhood, where he feels inadequate as a man, and where he has the emotional problems
of Mr. Whitney, that such would have no effect whafaoever upon his selling ability. Such a conclusion is totally
unreasonable. Certainly, there is a far greater connection
here between the injury and future earning capacity than
the mere ten percent (10%) disability to one leg as in
the Schlatter case.
Even if it were established that Instruction No. 15
were erroneous, said instruction was harmless. The instruction merely states the average length of humau life.
If this fact is irrelevant, it could not be prejudicial. The
life expectancy factor was never emphasized in the evidence and was given in the instruction as a fart upon
which the Court took judicial notice. Certainly any reasonably intelligent juror would be aware of the approximate length of human life even without the use of a
mortality table.
This Court has stated on many occas10ns that instructions must be considered as a whole. One instruction
should not be considered in isolation in order to predicate
a claim of error upon it. So long as the instructions present the issues in a fair and understandable manner, no
verdict will be nullified for minor errors or inconsistencies. Heywood vs. D. & R. G. Railroad ComzJany, 6 Utah
2d 155, 307 P.2d 1045; Taylor i·s. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d
16, 414 P.2d 575; Hales vs. Peterson, 11 Utah 2cl 411, 360
P.2d 882. A careful examination of all of the damage instructions in this case will clearly show that the abow
requisites are met. Respondent has been unable to fiml
14

any Utah case, nor has any been citecl hy the appellant
wlierein prejudicial <·1Tor has been founcl to result from
the giving of an imitruction on mortality tables.
Respondent further points out that the recorcl on
appeal clocs not show whether defendants made specific
ohjcrtion to lllstruction No. 15. The ohjecti011s to instruc\\'ere ma<l0 after the argum(•nts of eom1sel and after
the jury retired to cleliheratc. At that time, counsel for
the plaintiff paid no particular att<•ntion to clefeuclant's
ohjections aml, therefore, is unaware whether specific
objcrtions Wl'r<' statecl as requirC'cl by Hule ;)l, Utah Rules
of CiYil Proeedure. In any Pnnt, it is the responsibility
of the app0llant to proYiclP the Court with a proper record 011 appc·al. .\Tatters iiot 1>upporkd hy the n•cord are
not l'C\'icwahle on appeal. B11lle11 cs. A11rlerso11, 81 Utah
131, 27 P.2d 213.
POIXT IV

\YAS XO ERROR lX THE INTRODr("l'fOX 01<' .\1EDICAL EVIDENCE.
A ppe II ants under Point IV of their brief claim that
the C'onrt comrnitt<•d error in permitting a medical wit-

nt·ss to refer to a eomlition known as prostatiti1>. Prostatitis is mc•rely an inflnmmatio11 or an infedion of the
h· glawl ( T-4-.)). In l'Xarni n i ng Dr. Oniki, refcrf'JH·p was made to a m0dieal report of Dr. Dahl (who incidPntally cxamirn•cl thP plaintiff at the r<'qtwst of l\Ir.
J[idgk•y arnl is not plaintiff's doctor) (T-;)6). The trial
court pro1wrly n•fus<•d to permit eom1sel to refer to the
report ( T-+:n. Dr. 011iki was then asked if the tenderness
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and pain at the base of the penis was consistent with
prostatitis (T-45 ), and the '.viiness answered that it was
not ( T-45). Dr. Oniki was then asked a few questions regarding his own medical findings and was asked whether
he had a medical opinion as to whether or not Mr. Whitney had prostatitis (T-47). The answer \\'as "only to
the extent that Dr. Dahl has reported it, and since he
is the urologist, it is not out of line that he does report
this.'' While this answer may have been somewhat unresponsive and based upon heresay, it should be pointed
out that neither the question nor the answer was objected
to by the defendants. The matter was then dropped, and
the witness was examined as to other matters.
In addition to the fact that no objection was made to
the above answer, the whole episode over which appellants now claim error is rather insignificant when read
in light of the entire record and the entire testimony of
Dr. Oniki. The casual reference to prostatitis is somewhat trivial in comparison to the grievous permanent
injuries that were conclusiYdy established.
Appellants have cited no authority whatsoever to
show where any
rulinoof the Court was either improper
•
b
or prejudicial.
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POINT V
THERE IS NO SHOWING IN THIS
CASR THAT EXCESSIVE DAM AGES
WERE GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
It would appear to respondent that the facts of this

case speak for themselves with respect to the matter of
damages. Certainly an award of Thirty Eight Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty One Dollars And 40/100 ($38,851.40), which includes One Thousand Three Hundred
Fifty One Dollars And 40/100 ($1,351.40) special damages and Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Two
Dollars And 42/100 ($7,972.42) loss of income is modest
when considered in light of the serious nature of plaintiff's injuries. It is difficult to conceive of a.n injury more
serious to a man than the type of injury that this plaintiff has sustained.
The one case cited by appellants, Paul vs. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 does not support their
position, hut on the contrary would require an affirmation of the jury verdict. That case holds that the Supreme
Court should be very reluctant to interfere with the deeision of the jury and the trial court's ruling refusing a.
new trial, and further holds that the jury has a wide
l'ange of discretion in a.warding damages. The Court, in
that case, refused to grant the appellant a. new trial and
lwld that an award of Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred
Dollars ($11,800.00) for back injuries was not excessive.
The Court further held in the same case that an award of
FiYe Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) to the husband of the
17

injured party for partial loss of her services was not
excessive.
The more recent case of Sdrneider vs. Suhrma11n, 8
Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822, further elaborates upo11 the
reluctance of the appellate court to interf Pre with jury
verdicts:
"Cases dealing with th<' rC>view of <lamages
found by a jury, with invariable consistency, recite the reluctance of courts to interfere with surh
verdicts if there is any reasonable basis in the
evidence upon which tlwy can bC' sustai11C>cl. This
is based partly upon the often referred to advantages the fact triC>r has in being in immediate
contact with the trial, the parties and the witnesses. In addition thereto, the qn0stion of damages for personal injuries im·oh·ing the intangibles of pain and suffering, with respect to which
reasonable minds are apt to differ greatly, arr
matters which a jury is pe('uliarly adapted to determine'. One of the principal merits of the jur:·
system is that it brings tog<'ther people from different walks of life, with distinctive points of ,-iew
arising out of their varied exrwrie11ces. Bringing
these different points of view to hear upon the
appraisal of such values is a method to which the
parties haYe a right. It is in order to presene thi'
right of trial hy jury, aud to affonl litigants the
ach-antages referred to abon>, that it has hcPn the
policy of courts to exercise forbearance in disturbing jury
and to allow their deliberations to swinO' like a pe11clulum through a widr arc
without interference so lo11g m; they rC>main
the bounds of reason. 'fhe rt>fnsal of the tnal
court to modify the venlid endows it with some
further
of sanctity which increases our
hesitancy in clisturhing it upoll rc\·iew.''
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It is to be noted that in the case now before the Court,

the trial judge likewise considered defendants' Motion
for a New Trial and was of the opinion that defendants
ha<l been given a fair trial and that the damages were
not excessive.
12 A.L.R. 3d, 475 contains an exhaustive annotation
of cases dealing with excessiveness of damages in personal injury cases involving the organic systems of the
body. At Section 49 of this annotation, many cases are
cited dealing ·with impairment of the male sexual power
and function. It is to be noted from the annotation that
judgments in the One Hundred Thousand Dollar ($100,
000.00) category have been upheld as not being excessive.
Appellants have shown nothing whatsoever in their
brief which would indicate passion or prejudice on the
part of the jury.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
\VES'r & SCHA ERRER
Neil D. Schaerrer
David E. \Vest
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Responden.t

19

